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Abstract
Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods that
addresses pairwise envy by the removal of at most one good. In the worst case, each pair of agents
might require the (hypothetical) removal of a dierent good, resulting in a weak aggregate guaran-
tee. We study allocations that are nearly envy-free in aggregate, and dene a novel fairness notion
based on information withholding. Under our notion, an agent can withhold (or hide) some of the
goods in its bundle and reveal the remaining goods to the other agents. We observe that in prac-
tice, envy-freeness can be achieved by withholding only a small number of goods overall. We show
that nding allocations that withhold an optimal number of goods is computationally hard even
for highly restricted classes of valuations. On our way, we show that for binary valuations, nding
an envy-free allocation is NP-complete—somewhat surprisingly, this fundamental question was
unresolved prior to our work. In contrast to the worst-case results, our experiments on synthetic
and real-world preference data show that existing algorithms for nding EF1 allocations withhold
close-to-optimal amount of information.
1 Introduction
When dividing discrete objects, one often strives for a fairness notion called envy-freeness (Foley, 1967),
under which no agent prefers the allocation of another agent to its own. Such outcomes might not
exist in general (even with only two agents and a single indivisible good), motivating the need for
approximations. Among the many approximations of envy-freeness proposed in the literature (Lipton
et al., 2004; Budish, 2011; Nguyen and Rothe, 2014; Caragiannis et al., 2016), the one that has found
impressive practical appeal is envy-freeness up to one good (EF1). In an EF1 allocation, agent a can
envy agent b as long as there is some good in b’s bundle whose removal makes the envy go away. It
is known that an EF1 allocation always exists and can be computed in polynomial time (Lipton et al.,
2004).
A closer scrutiny, however, reveals that EF1 is not as strong as one might think: In the worst case, an
EF1 allocation could entail the (hypothetical) removal of every good. To see this, consider an instance
with six goods g1, . . . , g6 and three agents a1, a2, a3 whose (additive) valuations are as follows:
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6
a1 1 1 4 1 1 4
a2 1 4 1 1 4 1
a3 4 1 1 4 1 1
Observe that the allocation shown via circled goods is EF1, since any pairwise envy can be ad-
dressed by removing an underlined good. However, each pair of agents requires the removal of a
dierent good (e.g., a1’s envy towards a2 is addressed by removing g3 whereas a3’s envy towards a2 is
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addressed by removing g4, and so on), resulting in a weak approximation in aggregate (over all pairs
of agents).
The above example shows that EF1, on its own, is too coarse to distinguish between allocations
that remove a large number of goods (such as the one with circled entries) and those that remove only
a few (such as the one with underlined entries, which, in fact, is envy-free). This limitation highlights
the need for a fairness notion that (a) can distinguish between allocations in terms of their aggregate
approximation, and (b) retains the “up to one good” style approximation of EF1 that has proven to be
practically useful (Goldman and Procaccia, 2014). Our work aims to ll this important gap.
We propose a new fairness notion called envy-freeness up to k hidden goods (HEF-k), dened as
follows: Say there are n agents, m goods, and an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An). Suppose there is a
set S of k goods (called the hidden set) such that each agent i withholds the goods in Ai ∩ S (i.e., the
hidden goods owned by i) and only discloses the goods in Ai \ S to the other agents. Any other agent
h 6= i only observes the goods disclosed by i (i.e., those in Ai \ S), and its valuation for i’s bundle is
therefore vh(Ai \ S) instead of vh(Ai). Additionally, agent h’s valuation for its own bundle is vh(Ah)
(and not vh(Ah \ S)) because it can observe its own hidden goods. If, under the disclosed allocation,
no agent prefers the bundle of any other agent (i.e., if vh(Ah) ≥ vh(Ai \ S) for every pair of agents
i, h), then we say that A is envy-free up to k hidden goods (HEF-k). In other words, by withholding the
information about S, allocation A can be made free of envy.
Notice how HEF-k addresses the previous concerns: Like EF1, HEF-k is a relaxation of envy-
freeness that is dened in terms of the number of goods. However, unlike EF1, HEF-k oers a precise
quantication of the extent of information that must be withheld in order to achieve envy-freeness.
Of course, any allocation can be made envy-free by hiding all the goods (i.e., if k = m). The
real strength of HEF-k lies in k being small; indeed, an HEF-0 allocation is envy-free. As we will
demonstrate below, there are natural settings that admit HEF-k allocations with a small k (i.e., hide
only a small number of goods) even when (exact) envy-freeness is unlikely.
Information Withholding is Meaningful in Practice
To understand the usefulness of HEF-k, we generated a synthetic dataset where we varied the number
of agents n from 5 to 10, and the number of goods m from 5 to 20 (we ignore the cases where m < n).
For every xed n and m, we generated 100 instances with binary valuations. Specically, for every
agent i and every good j, the valuation vi,j is drawn i.i.d. from Bernoulli(0.7). Figure 1a shows the
heatmap of the number of instances out of 100 that do not admit envy-free outcomes. Figure 1b shows
the heatmap of the number of goods that must be hidden in the worst-case. That is, the color of each
cell denotes the smallest k such that each of the corresponding 100 instances admits some HEF-k
allocation.
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(a) Heatmap of the fraction of instances that are not
envy-free.
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(b) Heatmap of the number of goods that must be hid-
den.
Figure 1: In both gures, each cell corresponds to 100 instances with binary valuations for a xed number of goods
m (on X-axis) and a xed number of agents n (on Y-axis).
It is evident from Figure 1 that even in the regime where envy-free outcomes are unlikely (in
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particular, the red-colored cells in Figure 1a), there exist HEF-k allocations with k ≤ 3 (the light blue-
colored cells in Figure 1b). This observation, along with the foregoing discussion, shows that fairness
through information withholding is a well-motivated approach towards approximate envy-freeness
that yields promising existence results in practice.
Our Contributions We make contributions on three fronts.
• On the conceptual side, we propose a novel fairness notion called HEF-k as a ne-grained gen-
eralization of envy-freeness in terms of aggregate approximation.
• Our theoretical results (Section 4) show that computing HEF-k allocations is computationally
hard even for highly restricted classes of valuations (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1). We show a
similar result when HEF-k is coupled with Pareto optimality (Theorem 2). We also show that
nding an envy-free allocation is NP-complete even for binary valuations (Lemma 1). Surpris-
ingly, this fundamental problem was open prior to our work.
• Our experiments show that HEF-k allocations with a small k often exist, even when envy-free
allocations do not (Figure 1). We also compare several known algorithms for computing EF1
allocations on synthetic and real-world preference data, and nd that the round-robin algorithm
and a recent algorithm of Barman et al. (2018) withhold close-to-optimal amount of information,
often hiding no more than three goods (Section 5).
2 Related Work
An emerging line of work in the fair division literature considers relaxations of envy-freeness by lim-
iting the information available to the agents. Notably, Aziz et al. (2018) consider a setting where each
agent is aware only of its own bundle and has no knowledge about the allocations of the other agents.
They propose the notion of epistemic envy-freeness (EEF) under which each agent believes that an
envy-free allocation of the remaining goods among the other agents is possible. Note that in EEF, each
agent might consider a dierent hypothetical assignment of the remaining goods, and each of these
could be signicantly dierent from the actual underlying allocation. By contrast, under HEF-k, each
agent evaluates its valuation with respect to the same (underlying) allocation. Chen and Shah (2017)
study a related model where agents have probabilistic beliefs about the allocations of the other agents,
and envy is dened in expectation. Chan et al. (2019) study a setting similar to Aziz et al. (2018) where
each agent is unaware of the allocations of the other agents, but is guaranteed that its bundle is not
the worst.
Another related line of work considers settings where the agents constitute a social network and
can only observe the allocations of their neighbors (Abebe et al., 2017; Bei et al., 2017; Chevaleyre et al.,
2017; Aziz et al., 2018; Beynier et al., 2018; Bredereck et al., 2018). These works place an informational
constraint on the set of agents, whereas our model restricts the set of revealed goods per agent.
The asymptotic existence of envy-free allocations has been studied by Dickerson et al. (2014) and
Manurangsi and Suksompong (2018). Analyzing the asymptotic behavior of HEF-k allocations is an
interesting direction for future work.
3 Preliminaries
Problem instance An instance I = 〈[n], [m],V〉 of the fair division problem is dened by a set of
n ∈ N agents [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a set of m ∈ N goods [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, and a valuation prole
V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} that species the preferences of every agent i ∈ [n] over each subset of the goods
in [m] via a valuation function vi : 2[m] → N ∪ {0}. We will assume that the valuation functions are
additive, i.e., for any i ∈ [n] and G ⊆ [m], vi(G) :=
∑
j∈G vi({j}), where vi(∅) = 0. We will write
vi,j instead of vi({j}) for a singleton good j ∈ [m]. We say that an instance has binary valuations if
for every i ∈ [n] and every j ∈ [m], vi,j ∈ {0, 1}.
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Allocation An allocation A := (A1, . . . , An) refers to an n-partition of the set of goods [m], where
Ai ⊆ [m] is the bundle allocated to agent i. Given an allocation A, the utility of agent i ∈ [n] for the
bundle Ai is vi(Ai) =
∑
j∈Ai vi,j .
Denition 1 (Envy-freeness). An allocation A is envy-free (EF) if for every pair of agents i, h ∈ [n],
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ah). An allocation A is envy-free up to one good (EF1) if for every pair of agents i, h ∈ [n]
such that Ah 6= ∅, there exists some good j ∈ Ah such that vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ah \ {j}). An allocation A
is strongly envy-free up to one good (sEF1) if for every agent h ∈ [n] such that Ah 6= ∅, there exists a
good gh ∈ Ah such that for all i ∈ [n], vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ah \ {gh}). The notions of EF, EF1, and sEF1 are
due to Foley (1967), Budish (2011), and Conitzer et al. (2019) respectively.1
Denition 2 (Envy-freeness with hidden goods). An allocation A is said to be envy-free up to k
hidden goods (HEF-k) if there exists a set S ⊆ [m] of at most k goods such that for every pair of agents
i, h ∈ [n], we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ah \ S). An allocation A is envy-free up to k uniformly hidden goods
(uHEF-k) if there exists a set S ⊆ [m] of at most k goods satisfying |S ∩Ai| ≤ 1 for every i ∈ [n] such
that for every pair of agents i, h ∈ [n], we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ah \ S). We say that allocation A hides
the goods in S and reveals the remaining goods. Notice that a uHEF-k allocation is also HEF-k but the
converse is not necessarily true. Indeed, in Proposition 2, we will present an instance that, for some
k ∈ N, admits an HEF-k allocation but no uHEF-k allocation.
Remark 1. It follows from the denitions that an allocation is EF if and only if it is HEF-0. It is also
easy to verify that an allocation is sEF1 if and only if it is uHEF-n. This is because the unique hidden
good for every agent is also the one that is (hypothetically) removed under sEF1.
We say that allocation A is HEF with respect to set S if A becomes envy-free after hiding the goods
in S, i.e., for every pair of agents i, h ∈ [n], we have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ah \ S). We say that k goods must
be hidden underA ifA is HEF with respect to some set S such that |S| = k, and there is no set S′ with
|S′| < k such that A is HEF with respect to S′.
Denition 3 (Pareto optimality). An allocation A is Pareto dominated by another allocation B if
vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Ai) for every agent i ∈ [n] with at least one of the inequalities being strict. A Pareto
optimal (PO) allocation is one that is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation.
Denition 4 (EF1 algorithms). We will now describe four known algorithms for nding EF1 alloca-
tions that are especially relevant to our work.
Round-robin algorithm (RoundRobin): Fix a permutation σ of the agents. The RoundRobin algo-
rithm cycles through the agents according to σ. In each round, an agent gets its favorite good from the
pool of remaining goods.
Envy-graph algorithm (EnvyGraph): This algorithm was proposed by Lipton et al. (2004) and
works as follows: In each round, one of the remaining goods is assigned to an agent that is not envied
by any other agent. The existence of such an agent is guaranteed by resolving cyclic envy relations in
a combinatorial structure called the envy-graph of an allocation.
Fisher market-based algorithm (Alg-EF1+PO): This algorithm, due to Barman et al. (2018), uses
local search and price-rise subroutines in a Fisher market associated with the fair division instance, and
returns an EF1 and PO allocation. The bound on running time of this algorithm is pseudopolynomial
(i.e., is a polynomial in vi,j instead of log vi,j).
Maximum Nash Welfare solution (MNW): The Nash social welfare of an allocation A is dened as
NSW(A) :=
(∏
i∈[n] vi(Ai)
)1/n
. The MNW algorithm computes an allocation with the highest Nash
social welfare (called a Nash optimal allocation). Caragiannis et al. (2016) showed that a Nash optimal
allocation is both EF1 and PO.
1A slightly weaker notion than EF1 was previously studied by Lipton et al. (2004). However, their algorithm can be shown
to compute an EF1 allocation.
4
Remark 2. Conitzer et al. (2019) observed that RoundRobin, Alg-EF1+PO, and MNW algorithms all sat-
isfy sEF1. It is easy to see that EnvyGraph algorithm is also sEF1. However, note that among the
above algorithms, only MNW and Alg-EF1+PO are known to also satisfy PO.2 The allocations computed
by all four algorithms have the property that there exists some agent that is not envied by any other
agent. Indeed, MNW and Alg-EF1+PO are both PO and therefore cannot have cyclic envy relations, and
RoundRobin and EnvyGraph algorithms have this property by design. For such an agent (not neces-
sarily the same agent for all algorithms), no good needs to be removed under sEF1. Therefore, from
Remark 1, all these algorithms are also envy-free up to n−1 uniformly hidden goods, or uHEF-(n− 1).
Proposition 1. Given an instance with additive valuations, a uHEF-(n− 1) allocation always exists
and can be computed in polynomial time, and a uHEF-(n− 1) + PO allocation always exists and can be
computed in pseudopolynomial time.
Remark 3. Note that for any k < n− 1, an HEF-k allocation might fail to exist. Indeed, with n agents
that have identical and positive valuations for m = n− 1 goods, some agent will surely miss out and
force the allocation to hide all n− 1 (i.e., k + 1 or more) goods. Therefore, the bound in Proposition 1
for uHEF-k (and hence, for HEF-k) is tight in terms of k.
3.1 Relevant Computational Problems
Denition 5 formalizes the decision problem of whether a given instance admits an HEF-k allocation.
Denition 5 (HEF-k-Existence). Given an instance I , does there exist an allocation A and a set
S ⊆ [m] of at most k goods such that A is HEF with respect to S?
Notice that a certicate for HEF-k-Existence consists of an allocation A as well as a set S of at
most k hidden goods.
Another relevant computational question involves checking whether a given allocation A is HEF
with respect to some set S ⊆ [m] of at most k goods.
Denition 6 (HEF-k-Verification). Given an instance I and an allocationA, does there exist a set
S ⊆ [m] of k goods such that A is HEF with respect to S?
For additive valuations, both HEF-k-Existence and HEF-k-Verification are in NP. The next prob-
lem pertains to the existence of envy-free allocations.
Denition 7 (EF-Existence). Given an instance I , does there exist an envy-free allocation for I?
EF-Existence is known to be NP-complete (Lipton et al., 2004). From Remark 1, it follows that
HEF-k-Existence is NP-complete when k = 0 for additive valuations.
4 Theoretical Results
We will now present our theoretical results concerning the existence and computation of HEF-k and
uHEF-k allocations. Our rst result (Proposition 2) shows that uHEF-k is a strictly more demanding
notion than HEF-k.
Proposition 2. There exists an instance I that, for some k ∈ N, admits an HEF-k allocation but no
uHEF-k allocation.
Proof. Consider the fair division instance I with ve agents a1, . . . , a5 and six goods g1, . . . , g6 shown
in Table 1. Observe that the allocation A = (A1, . . . , A5) with A1 = {g1, g2}, A2 = {g3}, A3 = {g4},
A4 = {g5}, A5 = {g6} satises HEF-2 with respect to the set S = {g1, g2}.
2It is also known that RoundRobin and EnvyGraph fail to satisfy PO; see, e.g., (Conitzer et al., 2017).
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g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 g6
a1 1 1 2 0 0 0
a2 1 1 2 0 0 0
a3 10 10 1 1 1 1
a4 10 10 1 1 1 1
a5 10 10 1 1 1 1
Table 1: The instance used in the proof of Proposition 2.
We will show that I does not admit a uHEF-2 allocation. Suppose, for contradiction, that there
exists an allocation B satisfying uHEF-2. Then, B must hide g1 and g2 (otherwise, at least one of a3,
a4 or a5 will envy the owner(s) of these goods). Thus, in particular, the good g3 must be revealed byB.
Assume, without loss of generality, that g3 is not assigned to a1 inB (otherwise, a similar argument can
be carried out for a2). Then,B must assign both g1 and g2 to a1 (so that a1 does not envy the owner of
g3). However, this violates the one-hidden-good-per-agent property of uHEF-k—a contradiction.
Recall from Section 3.1 that HEF-k-Existence is NP-complete when k = 0. This still leaves open
the question whether HEF-k-Existence is NP-complete for any xed k ∈ N. Our next result (Theo-
rem 1) shows that this is indeed the case, even under the restricted setting of identical valuations (i.e.,
for every j ∈ [m], vi,j = vh,j for every i, h ∈ [n]).
Theorem1 (Hardness of HEF-k-Existence). For any xed k ∈ N,HEF-k-Existence is NP-complete
even for identical valuations.
Proof. We will show a reduction from Partition, which is known to be NP-complete (Garey and
Johnson, 1979). An instance of Partition consists of a multisetX = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}with xi ∈ N for
all i ∈ [n]. The goal is to determine whether there exists Y ⊂ X such that∑xi∈Y xi =∑xi∈X\Y xi =
T , where T := 12
∑
xi∈X xi.
We will construct a fair division instance with k+3 agents a1, . . . , ak+3 and n+ k+1 goods. The
goods are classied into n+1main goods g1, . . . , gn+1 and k dummy goods d1, . . . , dk. The (identical)
valuations are dened as follows: Every agent values the goods g1, . . . , gn at x1, . . . , xn respectively;
the good gn+1 at T , and each dummy good at 4T .
(⇒) SupposeY is a solution of Partition. Then, an HEF-k allocation can be constructed as follows:
Assign the main goods corresponding to the setY to agent a1 and those corresponding toX\Y to agent
a2. The good gn+1 is assigned to agent a3. Each of the remaining k agents is assigned a unique dummy
good. Note that every agent in the set {a1, a2, a3} envies every agent in the set {a4, . . . , ak+3}, and
these are the only pairs of agents with non-zero envy. Therefore, the allocation can be made envy-free
by hiding the k dummy goods, i.e., the allocation is HEF with respect to the set {d1, . . . , dk}.
(⇐) Now suppose there exists an HEF-k allocation A. Since there are k dummy goods and k + 3
agents, there must exist at least three agents that do not receive any dummy good in A. Without loss
of generality, let these agents be a1, a2 and a3 (otherwise, we can reindex). We claim that all dummy
goods must be hidden under A. Indeed, agent a1 does not receive any dummy good, and therefore its
maximum possible valuation can be v(g1∪· · ·∪gn+1) = 3T < v(dj) for any dummy good dj . If some
dummy good dj is not hidden, then a1 will envy the owner of dj , contradicting HEF-k. Therefore, all
dummy goods must be hidden, and since there are k such goods, these are the only ones that can be
hidden.
The above observation implies that the good gn+1 must be revealed byA. Furthermore, gn+1 must
be assigned to one of a1, a2 or a3 (otherwise, by pigeonhole principle, one of these agents will have
valuation at most 2T3 and will envy the owner of gn+1). If gn+1 is assigned to a3, then the remaining
main goods g1, . . . , gn must be divided between a1 and a2 such that v(A1) ≥ T and v(A2) ≥ T . This
gives a partition of X .
Another commonly used preference restriction is that of binary valuations (i.e., for every i ∈ [n]
and j ∈ [m], vi,j ∈ {0, 1}). We show that even under this restriction, HEF-k-Existence remains
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NP-complete when k = 0 (Corollary 1). This follows from Lemma 1, which shows that for binary
valuations, determining the existence of an envy-free allocation is NP-complete. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, the computational complexity of this fundamental problem was not addressed prior to our work,3
and might therefore be of independent interest.4 The proof of Lemma 1 appears in Section 6.1 in the
appendix.
Lemma 1. EF-Existence is NP-complete even for binary valuations.
Corollary 1. For k = 0, HEF-k-Existence is NP-complete even for binary valuations.
Lemma 1 is also useful in establishing the computational hardness of nding an HEF-k+PO alloca-
tion. Note that unlike Corollary 1, Theorem 2 holds for any xed k ∈ N.
Theorem 2 (Hardness of HEF-k+PO). Given any instance I with binary valuations and any xed
k ∈ N ∪ {0}, it is NP-hard to determine if I admits an allocation that is envy-free up to k hidden goods
(HEF-k) and Pareto optimal (PO).
Proof. (Sketch) Starting from any instance of EF-Existence with binary valuations (Lemma 1), we add
to it k new goods and k + 1 new agents such that all new goods are approved by all new agents (and
no one else). Also, the new agents have zero value for the existing goods. In the forward direction,
an arbitrary allocation of new goods among the new agents works. In the reverse direction, PO forces
each new (respectively, existing) good to be assigned among new (respectively, existing) agents only.
The imbalance between new agents and new goods means that all (and only) the new goods must be
hidden. Then, the restriction of the HEF-k allocation to the existing agents/goods gives the desired EF
allocation.
We will now proceed to analyzing the computational complexity of HEF-k-Verification. Here,
we show a hardness-of-approximation result (Theorem 3). The inapproximability factor is stated in
terms of the aggregate envy, dened as follows: Given any allocation A, the aggregate envy in A is the
sum of all pairwise envy values, i.e.,
EA :=
∑
h∈[n]
∑
i 6=hmax{0, vi(Ah)− vi(Ai)}.
Theorem 3 (HEF-k-Verification inapproximability). Given any ε > 0, it is NP-hard to approxi-
mate HEF-k-Verification to within (1− ε) · lnE even for binary valuations, where E is the aggregate
envy in the given allocation.
Proof. We will show a reduction from Hitting Set. An instance of Hitting Set consists of a nite
set X = {x1, . . . , xp}, a collection F = {F1, . . . , Fq} of subsets of X , and some k ∈ N. The goal is
to determine whether there exists Y ⊆ X , |Y | ≤ k that intersects every member of F (i.e., for every
F ∈ F , Y ∩ F 6= ∅). It is known that given any ε > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate Hitting Set to
within a factor (1− ε) · ln |F| (Dinur and Steurer, 2014).
We will construct a fair division instance with n = q + 1 agents and m = p +
∑q
i=1(|Fi| − 1)
goods. The agents are classied into q dummy agents a1, . . . , aq and one main agent aq+1. The goods
are classied into pmain goods g1, . . . , gp and q distinct sets of dummy goods, where the ith set consists
of the goods f i1, . . . , f i|Fi|−1.
The valuations are as follows: The main agent approves all the main goods, i.e., for all j ∈ [p],
vq+1({gj}) = 1. Each dummy agent ai approves the dummy goods in the ith set as well as those main
3We remark that our contribution is to show that EF-Existence remains NP-complete even under binary valuations;
without this restriction, NP-completeness was already known (Lipton et al., 2004).
4A closely related problem of determining the existence of an envy-free (EF) and Pareto optimal (PO) allocation was
shown to be NP-complete for binary valuations by Bouveret and Lang (2008). It is easy to check that our proof of Lemma 1
actually constructs a PO allocation (while assuming only EF), and therefore implies the result of Bouveret and Lang (2008)
as a corollary.
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goods that intersect with Fi, i.e., for every i ∈ [q], vi({f ij}) = 1 for all j ∈ [|Fi| − 1], and vi({gj}) = 1
whenever xj ∈ Fi. All other valuations are set to 0.
The input allocation A = (A1, . . . , Aq+1) is dened as follows: The main agent aq+1 is assigned
all the main goods, i.e., Aq+1 := {g1, . . . , gp}. For every i ∈ [q], the dummy agent ai is assigned the
|Fi| − 1 dummy goods in the ith set, i.e., Ai := {f i1, . . . , f i|Fi|−1}. Note that in the allocation A, each
dummy agent envies the main agent by one approved good, and these are the only pairs of agents with
envy.
(⇒) Suppose Y ⊆ X , |Y | ≤ k is solution of the Hitting Set instance. We claim that the allocation
A is HEF with respect to the set S := {gj : xj ∈ Y } with |S| ≤ k. Indeed, since S is induced by a
hitting set, each dummy agent approves at least one good in S. Therefore, by hiding the goods in S,
the envy from the dummy agents can be eliminated.
(⇐) Now suppose there exists S ⊆ [m], |S| ≤ k such that A is HEF with respect to S. Then,
for every i ∈ [q], the set S must contain at least one good that is approved by the dummy agent ai
(otherwise A will not be envy-free after hiding the goods in S). It is easy to see that the set Y := {xj :
gj ∈ S} constitutes the desired hitting set of cardinality at most k.
Finally, to show the hardness-of-approximation, notice that the aggregate envy in A is q because
each dummy agent envies the main agent by one unit of utility. The claim now follows by substituting
|F| = q = E in the inapproximability result of Hitting Set stated above.
Our next result (Theorem 4) provides an approximation algorithm that (nearly) matches the hardness-
of-approximation result in Theorem 3. We remark that while Theorem 3 holds even for binary valua-
tions, the algorithm works for any instance with additive valuations.
Theorem 4 (Approximation algorithm). There is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given as input
any instance of HEF-k-Verification, nds a set S ⊆ [m] with |S| ≤ kopt · lnE +1 such that the given
allocation is HEF with respect to S. Here, E and kopt denote the aggregate envy and the number of goods
that must be hidden under the given allocation respectively.
The proof of Theorem 4 is deferred to Section 6.2 in the appendix, but a brief idea is as follows: For
any set S ⊆ [m], dene the residual envy function f : 2[m] → R so that f(S) is the aggregate envy in
allocation A after hiding the goods in S ⊆ [m]. That is,
f(S) :=
∑
h∈[n]
∑
i 6=hmax{0, vi(Ah \ S)− vi(Ai)}.
The relevant observation is that f is supermodular. Given this observation, the approximation guar-
antee in Theorem 4 can be obtained by the standard greedy algorithm for submodular maximization,
or, equivalently, supermodular minimization (Nemhauser et al., 1978); see Algorithm 1 in Section 6.2.
5 Experimental Results
We have seen that the worst-case computational results for HEF-k, even in highly restricted settings,
are mostly negative (Section 4). In this section, we will examine whether the known algorithms for
computing approximately envy-free allocations—in particular, the four EF1 algorithms described in
Denition 4 in Section 3—can provide meaningful approximations to HEF-k in practice. Recall from
Remark 2 that all four discussed algorithms—RoundRobin, MNW, Alg-EF1+PO, and EnvyGraph—satisfy
uHEF-(n− 1).
We evaluate each algorithm in terms of (a) its regret (dened below), and (b) the number of goods
that the algorithmmust hide. Given an instance I and an allocationA, let κ(A, I) denote the number of
goods that must be hidden under A. The regret of allocation A is the number of extra goods that must
be hidden underA compared to the optimal. That is, reg(A, I) := κ(A, I)−minB κ(B, I). Similarly,
given an algorithm Alg, the regret of Alg is given by reg(Alg(I), I), where Alg(I) is the allocation
returned by Alg for the input instance I . Note that the regret can be large due to the suboptimality of
an algorithm, but also due to the size of the instance. To negate the eect of the latter, we normalize
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Table 2: Results for synthetic data.
the regret value by n− 1, which, as discussed above, is the worst-case upper bound on the number of
hidden goods for all four algorithms of interest.
Our experiments on synthetic and real-world preference data are presented in Section 5.1 and
Section 5.2 respectively.
5.1 Experiments on Synthetic Data
The setup for synthetic experiments is similar to that used in Figure 1. Specically, the number of
agents, n, is varied from 5 to 10, and the number of goods, m, is varied from 5 to 20 (we ignore the
cases where m < n). For every xed n and m, we generated 100 instances with binary valuations
drawn i.i.d. from Bernoulli distribution with parameter 0.7 (i.e., vi,j ∼ Ber(0.7)). Table 2 shows the
heatmaps of the normalized regret (averaged over 100 instances) and the number of goods that must
be hidden (averaged over non-EF instances, i.e., whenever k ≥ 1) for all four algorithms.5
It is clear that Alg-EF1+PO and RoundRobin algorithms have a superior performance than MNW and
EnvyGraph. In particular, both Alg-EF1+PO and RoundRobin have small normalized regret, suggesting
that they hide close-to-optimal number of goods. Additionally, the number of hidden goods itself is
small for these algorithms (in most cases, no more than three goods need to be hidden), suggesting that
the worst-case bound of n − 1 is unlikely to arise in practice. Overall, our experiments suggest that
Alg-EF1+PO and RoundRobin can achieve useful approximations to HEF-k in practice, especially in
comparison to MNW and EnvyGraph.6
5.2 Experiments on Real-World Data
For experiments with real-world data, we use the data from the popular fair division website Spliddit
(Goldman and Procaccia, 2014). The Spliddit data has 2212 instances in total, where the number of
agents n varies between 3 and 10, and the number of goods m ≥ n varies between 3 and 93. Unlike
the synthetic data, the distribution of instances here is rather uneven (see Figure 3 in the appendix);
in fact, 1821 of the 2212 instances have n = 3 agents and m = 6 goods. Therefore, instead of using
heatmaps, we compare the algorithms in terms of their normalized regret (averaged over the entire
dataset) and the cumulative distribution function of the hidden goods (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 presents an interesting twist: MNW is now the best performing algorithm, closely followed
by RoundRobin and Alg-EF1+PO. For any xed k, the fraction of instances for which these three al-
5The appendix provides additional results for vi,j ∼ Ber(0.7) in Table 4, and for vi,j ∼ Ber(0.5) in Table 5.
6In Section 6.3 in the appendix, we present two families of instances where the normalized worst-case regret of MNW is
large.
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Figure 2: Results for Spliddit data.
gorithms compute an HEF-k allocation is also nearly identical. As can be observed, these algorithms
almost never need to hide more than three goods. By contrast, EnvyGraph has the largest regret and
signicantly worse cumulative performance. Therefore, once again, Alg-EF1+PO and RoundRobin al-
gorithms perform competitively with the optimal solution, making them attractive options for achiev-
ing fair outcomes without withholding too much information.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall the statement of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. EF-Existence is NP-complete even for binary valuations.
Our proof uses a reduction from Eqitable Coloring, which is dened below.
Denition 8 (Eqitable Coloring). Given a graph G and a number ` ∈ N, does there exist a proper
coloring of G such that all color classes are of equal size?
The standard denition of Eqitable Coloring requires the color classes to dier in size by at
most one. We overload the term to refer to the version where all color classes are of the same size.
Eqitable Coloring (in Denition 8) can be shown to be NP-complete by a straightforward reduction
from Graph k-Colorability (Garey and Johnson, 1979). In addition, we can assume ` ≥ 3 without
loss of generality.
Proof. (of Lemma 1) We will show a reduction from Eqitable Coloring. Recall from Denition 8
that an instance of Eqitable Coloring consists of a graph G = (V,E) and a number ` ∈ N. The
goal is to determine a proper coloring of G where the color classes are of the same size. For simplicity,
we will write n := |V | and m := |E|.7 Note that we can assume, without loss of generality, that G is
connected. Since a connected graph with n vertices has at least n− 1 edges, we have that
m ≥ n− 1. (1)
In addition, we will also assume that each vertex inG has degree at least two. Indeed, for any degree
one vertex v that is adjacent to some edge (v, v′), we can add ` − 2 new vertices v1, v2, . . . , v`−1 to
create the following cycle: {(v, v1), (v1, v2), . . . , (v`−2, v′), (v′, v)}. Call the new graph G′. It is easy
to see that G has an equitable `-coloring if and only if G′ does.
We will construct a fair division instance with m + n goods and m + k agents. The agents are
classied into m edge agents a1, . . . , am and ` dummy agents d1, . . . , d`. The goods are classied into
n vertex goods v1, . . . , vn and m edge goods e1, . . . , em. Note that we use the same notation for the
vertices (edges) and the corresponding vertex (edge) goods.
The preferences of the agents are dened as follows: For every edge e = (vi, vj), an edge agent ae
approves all the edge goods and exactly two vertex goods vi and vj . Each dummy agent approves all
the vertex goods and has zero value for the edge goods.
(⇒) Suppose G admits an equitable coloring with each color class of size `. Then, an envy-free
allocation A can be constructed as follows: Assign each edge good e to the edge agent ae and each
vertex good v to the dummy agent di if vertex v has color i. Notice that all goods are allocated under
A. Also note that no two edge agents envy each other since each of them gets exactly one edge good.
Furthermore, due to the proper coloring condition, for any edge e = (vi, vj) in G, the corresponding
vertex goods vi and vj are assigned to distinct dummy agents. Hence, no edge agent envies a dummy
agent. The dummy agents have zero value for the edge goods and therefore do not envy the edge
agents. Finally, since all color classes are of the same size, each dummy agent gets exactly ` approved
goods, and therefore does not envy any other dummy agent. Overall, the allocation is envy-free.
(⇐) Now suppose there exists an envy-free allocationA. We will show thatA satises Properties 1
to 6 that will help us infer an equitable coloring of G.
Property 1. No edge agent can get two or more edge goods under A.
7Not be confused with the number of agents, n, and the number of goods, m, as dened in Section 3.
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Proof. (of Property 1) Suppose, for contradiction, that some edge agent ae gets two or more edge goods.
Then, any other edge agent ae′ has a utility of at least 2 for the bundle of ae. For A to be envy-free,
ae′ must have a utility of at least 2 for its own bundle. For binary valuations, this means that ae′ must
be assigned two or more goods that it approves. Therefore, we need at least 2m goods to satisfy the
edge agents. The total number of available goods is m + n, which, using Equation (1), evaluates to
at most 2m + 1. This leaves at most one good to be allocated among ` dummy agents. Since ` ≥ 3
(Denition 8), some dummy agent is bound to be envious, contradicting the envy-freeness of A.
Property 2. Every dummy agent gets at least one vertex good under A.
Proof. (of Property 2) Fix a vertex good v and a dummy agent d. Then, either v is assigned to d, or
d gets some other (approved) good to prevent it from envying the owner of v. Since the only goods
approved by the dummy agents are the vertex goods, the claim follows.
Property 3. No dummy agent can get an edge good under A.
Proof. (of Property 3) Suppose, for contradiction, that a dummy agent d gets an edge good e under A.
From Property 2, we know that d also gets some vertex good, say v0. By assumption, the graph G has
minimum degree two, so there must exist some edge e1 = (v0, v1) adjacent to the vertex v0. Notice
that the edge agent ae1 has a utility of (at least) 2 for the bundle of d. Therefore, for A to be envy-free,
ae1 must get at least two goods that it approves. Property 1 limits the number of edge goods assigned
to any edge agent to at most one. Therefore, in addition to some edge good, ae1 must also get the
vertex good v1. Once again using the bound on minimum degree of G, we get that there must exist
some edge e2 = (v1, v2) adjacent to the vertex v1. A similar argument shows that the vertex good
v2 must be assigned to the edge agent ae2 . Continuing in this manner, we will eventually encounter
an edge ei = (vi−1, vi) such that vi−1 is already assigned to aei−1 and vi is already assigned to either
d or some other edge agent. This would imply that aei is envious of some other agent under A—a
contradiction.
Property 4. Every edge agent gets exactly one edge good under A.
Proof. (of Property 4) Follows from Properties 1 and 3.
Property 5. No edge agent can get a vertex good under A.
Proof. (of Property 5) The argument is similar to that of Property 3. Suppose, for contradiction, that
some edge agent ae0 is assigned a vertex good v0. Let e1 = (v0, v1) be an edge incident to the vertex
v0 in G (such an edge must exist due to the bound on minimum degree). From Property 4, we know
that each edge agent gets exactly one edge good. Thus, the edge agent ae1 has a utility of (at least)
2 for the bundle of the agent ae0 . For A to be envy-free, ae1 must receive two or more goods that it
approves, only one of which can be an edge good. Therefore, agent ae1 must also receive the vertex
good v1. Now let e2 = (v1, v2) be an edge incident to the vertex v1 in G. A similar argument implies
that the vertex good v2 must be assigned to the edge agent ae2 . Continuing in this manner, we will
encounter an edge ei = (vi−1, vi) such that the vertex good vi−1 is assigned to the edge agent aei−1
and the vertex good vi is assigned to some other edge agent. Thus, the edge agent aei has a utility of
2 for the bundle of some other edge agent, even though it values its own bundle at 1. This contradicts
the envy-freeness of A.
Property 6. For any edge e = (vi, vj), no dummy agent is assigned both vertex goods vi and vj under
A.
Proof. (of Property 6) Suppose, for contradiction, that for some edge e = (vi, vj), a dummy agent d
is assigned both vi and vj . Property 4 implies that the utility of ae for its own bundle is exactly 1.
However, the utility of ae for the bundle of d is 2, contradicting the envy-freeness of A.
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It follows from Property 5 that all vertex goods must be allocated among the dummy agents. Now
consider the following coloring of the graph G: For each vertex v, the color of v is the index of the
dummy agent that gets the vertex good v. Property 6 implies that the coloring is proper. Furthermore,
due to envy-freeness of A, agents with identical valuations must have equal utilities. Therefore, each
dummy agent gets the same number of vertex goods, implying that the coloring is equitable. This
completes the proof of Lemma 1.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Recall the statement of Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 (Approximation algorithm). There is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given as input
any instance of HEF-k-Verification, nds a set S ⊆ [m] with |S| ≤ kopt · lnE +1 such that the given
allocation is HEF with respect to S. Here, E and kopt denote the aggregate envy and the number of goods
that must be hidden under the given allocation respectively.
Recall from Section 4 that given any allocationA, the residual envy function f : 2[m] → R is dened
as follows:
f(S) :=
∑
h∈[n]
∑
i 6=hmax{0, vi(Ah \ S)− vi(Ai)}.
Here, f(S) is the aggregate envy inA after hiding the goods in S ⊆ [m]. We will show in Lemma 2
that f is supermodular, i.e., for any pair of sets S, T ⊆ [m] such that S ⊆ T and any good j /∈ T , f(S)−
f(S ∪ {j}) ≥ f(T )− f(T ∪ {j}). The proof of Theorem 4 will then follow from the standard greedy
algorithm for submodular maximization, or, equivalently, supermodular minimization (Nemhauser
et al., 1978).
Lemma 2. The residual envy function f is supermodular.
Proof. We will start with the necessary notation. For any agent h ∈ [n] and any other agent i ∈
[n] \ {h}, dene fh,i(S) := max{0, vi(Ah \ S) − vi(Ai)} as the envy of i towards h after hiding the
goods in S. Also, let fh(S) :=
∑
i 6=h fh,i(S) denote the total (aggregate) envy towards h. We therefore
have f(S) =
∑
h∈[n] fh(S) =
∑
h∈[n]
∑
i 6=h fh,i(S).
Notice that fh,i is a monotone non-increasing set function, i.e., for any S ⊆ T , we have fh,i(S) ≥
fh,i(T ). Also notice that for any T ⊆ [m] and any j ∈ [m]\T , we have that fh,i(T )−fh,i(T ∪{j}) ≤
vi,j .
For any set of goods S ⊆ [m] and any agent h ∈ [n], dene Eh(S) := {i ∈ [n] : fh,i(S) > 0} as
the set of agents that envy agent h even after the goods in S are hidden. Notice that if S ⊆ T , then
Eh(T ) ⊆ Eh(S). Thus, if for some agent i we have that i /∈ Eh(S), then i /∈ Eh(T ), and therefore
fh,i(S) = fh,i(T ) = 0.
Dene Nj := {i ∈ [n] : vi,j > 0} as the set of agents that have a strictly positive valuation for the
good j.
We will now prove that f is supermodular, i.e., for any S ⊆ T and any good j /∈ T , f(S)− f(S ∪
{j}) ≥ f(T ) − f(T ∪ {j}). Let r ∈ [n] be the owner of good j under A, i.e., j ∈ Ar . Notice that if
i /∈ Nj (i.e., vi,j = 0), then additivity of valuations implies vi(Ar \ S) = vi(Ar \ S ∪ {j}). Thus,
f(S)− f(S ∪ {j}) = fr(S)− fr(S ∪ {j})
=
∑
i 6=r fr,i(S)− fr,i(S ∪ {j})
=
∑
i∈Er(S) fr,i(S)− fr,i(S ∪ {j})
=
∑
i∈Er(S)∩Nj fr,i(S)− fr,i(S ∪ {j}), (2)
where the rst equality uses the fact that for any h 6= r, we have fh(S) = fh(S ∪ {j}), the third
equality uses the fact that if i /∈ Er(S), then fr,i(S) = fr,i(S ∪ {j}) = 0, and the fourth equality uses
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ALGORITHM 1: Greedy Approximation Algorithm for HEF-k-Verification
Input: An instance 〈[n], [m],V〉 and an allocation A.
Output: A set S ⊆ [m].
1 Initialize S = ∅.
2 while f(S) ≥ 1 do
3 Set j′ ← argmaxj∈[m]\S f(S)− f(S ∪ {j})
. tiebreak lexicographically
4 Update S ← S ∪ {j′}
5 return S
the fact that vi(Ar \ S) = vi(Ar \ S ∪ {j}) whenever i /∈ Nj . By a similar reasoning for the set T , we
get that
f(T )− f(T ∪ {j}) =∑i∈Er(T )∩Nj fr,i(T )− fr,i(T ∪ {j}). (3)
Recall that Er(T ) ⊆ Er(S). Therefore, Equation (2) can be rewritten as
f(S)− f(S ∪ {j}) =∑i∈Er(T )∩Nj fr,i(S)− fr,i(S ∪ {j})+∑
i∈Er(S)\Er(T )∩Nj fr,i(S)− fr,i(S ∪ {j})
≥∑i∈Er(T )∩Nj fr,i(S)− fr,i(S ∪ {j}), (4)
where the inequality follows from the use of the monotonicity of fr,i for all i ∈ Er(S) \ Er(T ) ∩Nj .
Therefore, from Equations (3) and (4), it suces to show that for every i ∈ Er(T ) ∩Nj , fr,i(S)−
fr,i(S ∪ {j}) ≥ fr,i(T )− fr,i(T ∪ {j}). We will prove this by contradiction.
Suppose, for contradiction, that for some i ∈ Er(T ) ∩ Nj , we have fr,i(S) − fr,i(S ∪ {j}) <
fr,i(T )− fr,i(T ∪{j}). Then, we must have i ∈ Er(S ∪{j}), since otherwise we get i /∈ Er(T ∪{j})
and therefore fr,i(S ∪ {j}) = fr,i(T ∪ {j}) = 0. This would imply that fr,i(S) < fr,i(T ), which
contradicts the monotonicity of fr,i. Hence, for any i ∈ Er(T )∩Nj , we also have that i ∈ Er(S∪{j}).
Notice that for any i ∈ Er(S ∪ {j})∩Nj , we have fr,i(S)− fr,i(S ∪ {j}) = vi,j by the additivity
of valuations. However, this would require that fr,i(T )−fr,i(T ∪{j}) > vi,j , which is a contradiction.
Therefore, the function f must be supermodular.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof. (of Theorem 4) Note that allocation A is HEF with respect to a set S if and only if f(S) ≤ 0.
For integral valuations, f(S) ≤ 0 if and only if f(S) < 1. Therefore, it suces to compute a set S in
polynomial time such that |S| ≤ kopt · lnE + 1 and f(S) < 1.
Consider the greedy algorithm described in Algorithm 1. At each step, the algorithm adds to the
current set the good that provides the largest reduction in the residual envy. This process is continued
as long as f(S) ≥ 1. Since there are m goods, it is clear that the algorithm terminates in at most m
steps. Furthermore, from the above observation, it follows that the allocation A is HEF with respect to
the set S returned by the algorithm. Therefore, all that remains to be shown is a bound on |S|.
Observe that f(∅) = E. Recall from the proof of Lemma 2 that f is a sum of monotone non-
increasing set functions, and is therefore itself monotone non-increasing. Dene another set function
g : 2[m] → R as follows:
g(S) := E − f(S).
Notice that g is a non-negative, monotone non-decreasing, and integer-valued submodular function
with g(∅) = 0. Therefore, our goal is to nd a set S such that g(S) > E − 1.
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g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
a1 1 0 0 0 0
a2 10 1 0 0 0
a3 0 10 1 0 0
a4 0 0 10 1 0
a5 0 0 0 10 1
Table 3: The instance used in proof of Proposition 4.
We will now use the result of Nemhauser et al. (1978) for submodular maximization stated below
as Proposition 3. In particular, let p := kopt be the size of the optimal hidden set (i.e., the number of
goods that must be hidden under A). Then,
max
S:|S|≤p
g(S) = E − min
S:|S|≤kopt
f(S) = E.
From the bound in Proposition 3, we have that
(1− e−q/p) max
S:|S|≤p
g(S) > E − 1
⇐⇒ (1− e−q/kopt) · E > E − 1
⇐⇒ 1− e−q/kopt > 1− 1/E
⇐⇒ ln 1E > −q/kopt
⇐⇒ q > kopt lnE.
Thus, after q > kopt lnE steps, any set S constructed by the algorithm satises g(S) > E − 1, or,
equivalently, f(S) < 1, giving us the desired bound |S| ≤ kopt lnE + 1. This completes the proof of
Theorem 4.
Proposition 3 (Nemhauser et al. (1978), Krause and Golovin (2014)). Let g : 2[m] → R≥0 be amonotone
non-decreasing submodular function, and let {Si}i≥0 be the sequence of sets constructed in Algorithm 1.
Then, for any positive integers p and q, we have that
g(Sq) ≥ (1− e−q/p) max
S:|S|≤p
g(S).
6.3 MNW can have large regret in the worst-case
This section presents two results concerning the worst-case regret of MNW solution. In Proposition 4,
we will provide a family of instances for which the normalized regret of MNW approaches 1 (i.e., the
maximum possible value). In Proposition 5, we will show a slightly weaker limit (1/2 instead of 1) that
holds even for the restricted domain of binary valuations. We will use κopt(I) := minA κ(A, I) to
denote the smallest number of goods that must be hidden under any allocation in the instance I .
Proposition 4. There exists a family of instances for which the normalized regret of any Nash optimal
allocation approaches 1 in the limit.
Proof. Consider the fair division instance I with ve agents a1, . . . , a5 and ve goods g1, . . . , g5 shown
in Table 3. The unique Nash optimal allocation (say A) for this instance assigns gi to ai for every
i ∈ [5]. Thus, the goods g1, g2, g3, g4 must be hidden under A, i.e., κ(A, I) = 4. On the other hand,
an allocation (say B) that assigns g5 to a1, and gi−1 to ai for every i ∈ {2, . . . , 5} only needs to hide
the good g1. Indeed, κopt(I) = 1 since any allocation must hide g1 to avoid envy from a1 or a2. The
desired family of instances is the natural extension of the above example to n agents and n goods. In
the limit, the normalized regret of the Nash optimal allocation is limn→∞ (n−1)−1n−1 = 1.
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Figure 3: Distribution of the Spliddit data. The color of each cell denotes the number of instances in the dataset with
the corresponding number of goods,m, on the X axis, and number of agents, n, on the Y axis.
Proposition 5. There exists a family of instances with binary valuations for which the normalized regret
of any Nash optimal allocation approaches 1/2 in the limit.
Proof. Fix some t ∈ N. Consider an instance In with 2t+ 1 agents, consisting of t groups of ordinary
agents {ai, bi}i∈[t] and one special agent s. The goods are also classied into t groups, with group i
comprising of ve goods gi,1, . . . , gi,5. For each i ∈ [t], both ai and bi approve all ve goods in group
i and have zero value for all the other goods. The special agent s approves all the goods.
The above instance admits an envy-free allocation A in which s gets one good from each group,
and the other goods are allocated evenly among the group members. That is, for each i ∈ [t], ai gets
{gi,1, gi,2}, bi gets {gi,3, gi,4}, and s gets gi,5. Thus, κopt(In) = 0.
Let B denote any Nash optimal allocation. It is easy to see that B is of one of the following two
canonical forms:
• Either s gets two goods from two dierent groups and the rest of the goods are assigned ‘evenly,’
i.e., for each i ∈ [t − 2], ai gets {gi,1, gi,2, gi,3} and bi gets {gi,4, gi,5}, and for i ∈ {t − 1, t}, ai
gets {gi,1, gi,2}, bi gets {gi,3, gi,4} and s gets gi,5,
• or, s gets three goods from three dierent groups and the other goods are assigned ‘evenly,’ i.e.,
for each i ∈ [t− 3], ai gets {gi,1, gi,2, gi,3} and bi gets {gi,4, gi,5}, and for i ∈ {t− 2, t− 1, t}, ai
gets {gi,1, gi,2}, bi gets {gi,3, gi,4} and s gets gi,5.
Either way, B must hide at least t− 3 goods (one good in each of the groups 1, . . . , t− 3 to avoid
envy from bi). Thus, reg(B, In) = κ(B, In) = t− 3.
The desired family of instances can be obtained by choosing an arbitrarily large t. In the limit, the
normalized regret of B is limt→∞ t−32t =
1
2 .
6.4 Additional Experimental Results
Table 4 presents additional results for the synthetic data used in Section 5.1 (i.e., binary valuations with
vi,j ∼ Ber(0.7) i.i.d.). This time, we compare the algorithms in terms of their (a) normalized worst-
case regret (over the 100 instances), (b) the frequency with which the algorithms compute envy-free
outcomes, and (c) the worst-case number of goods that must be hidden by each algorithm. The trend is
similar to that in Section 5.1, with Alg-EF1+PO and RoundRobin outperforming MNW and EnvyGraph.
Table 5 presents similar results for Bernoulli parameter 0.5. Finally, Figure 3 illustrates the distribution
of the Spliddit data. As can be seen, a large fraction of instances have between 3 and 6 agents and
between 3 and 15 goods, with a sharp spike at n = 3 and m = 6.
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Normalized worst-case regret
Alg-EF1+PO RoundRobin MNW EnvyGraph
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Number of goods that must be hidden in the worst-case (max over all 100 instances)
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Table 4: Comparing various EF1 algorithms over synthetically generated binary instances with vi,j ∼ Ber(0.7)
i.i.d.
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Number of goods that must be hidden in the worst-case (max over all 100 instances)
Alg-EF1+PO RoundRobin MNW EnvyGraph
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Table 5: Comparing various EF1 algorithms over synthetically generated binary instances with vi,j ∼ Ber(0.5)
i.i.d.
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